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Jones: Protection of Correlative Rights in Wyoming

LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME III

1968

NUMBER 2

The Wyoming legislature recently amended the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act to direct the protection of correlative rights as defined
therein. Professor Jones outlines the scope of the common law
obligation to protect the correlative rights of overlying surface owners,
compares it with the statutory obligation, and concludes that the
common law right exceeds that established by the legislature.

PROTECTION OF CORRELATIVE
RIGHTS IN WYOMING
Jack D. Jones*

M

in early 1967, the 39th State Legislature of
Wyoming amended the Oil and Gas Conservation Act'
by, among other things, enjoining the commission to protect
"correlative rights." ' 2 Section 1 of the Act, as amended,
defines the term correlative rights as follows:
(i) Correlative rights.-" Correlative rights"
shall mean the opportunity afforded the owner of
each property in a pool to produce, so far as it is
reasonably practicable to do so without waste, his
just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both,
in the pool.
By making such a requirement, i.e., that the commission protect correlative rights, and in defining the term in relation
to the opportunity to produce a "just and equitable share,"
any discussion or determination of the scope of the obligation
requires first that we determine what "correlative rights"
are and whether or not they are as limited as this definition
indicates.
EETING

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law; Research Fellow, So. Methodist University, 1963-64; LL.B., University of
Wyoming, 1949; Member of the Wyoming Bar.
1. Wyo. STAT. §§ 80-216 to -238 (Comp. 1967), amended by Ch. 167 [1967]
Wyo. Sess. Laws 477-78.
2. Ch. 167, § 1, [1967] Wyo. Sess. Laws 478; WYo. STAT. § 30-216(i) (Comp.
1967).
*
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The concept of correlative rights appears to have been
originally recognized in this country, insofar as oil and gas
are concerned, in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana.' The Supreme
Court stated the concept in the following language:
[A]s to gas and oil, the surface proprietors within
the gas field all have the right to reduce to possession
the gas and oil beneath. They could not be absolutely deprived of the right which belongs to them
without taking of private property. But there is a
co-equal right in them all to take from a common
source of supply, the two substances which in the
nature of things are united, though separate. It
follows from the essence of their right and from the
situation of the things, as to which it can be exerted,
that the use by one of his power to seek to convert
a part of the common fund to actual possession may
result in an undue proportion being attributed to one
of the possessors of the right, to the detriment of the
others, or by waste by one or more, to the annihilation of the rights of the remainder. Hence it is that
the legislative power, from the peculiar nature of the
right and the objects upon which it is to be exerted,
can be manifested for the purpose of protecting all
the collective owners, by securing a just distribution,
to arise from the enjoyment by them, of their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach the like
end by preventing waste.4
By this language the Supreme Court would appear to have
established certain basics as to correlative rights. Thus, it
would seem the following propositions are applicable to the
so-called correlative rights:
(1) The concept of correlative rights is derived from the
co-equal right of all the surface owners overlying the common
source of supply to take the oil and/or gas therein and to
reduce it to possession. Thus, we are able to determine that
the rights exist in all of the owners of the surface overlying
the common source of supply and that the rights are co-equal
(correlative) making them, apparently, rights in the nature
of the right to lateral support which is said to be a co-equal
right inherent in the ownership of land.' However, the rights
3. 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
4. Id. at 209-210.
5. Prete v. Cray, 49 R.I. 209, 141 A. 609 (1928).
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exist only in the surface owners overlying the common source
of supply and, in this respect, are limited rights.
(2) Correlative rights exist independently of, and apart
from, statutory recognition since the legislative power can be
exercised in this area only to protect all the collective owners.
(3) The legislative power to regulate correlative rights
can be used to (a) protect "all the collective owners, by
securing a just distribution," and (b) to prevent waste to
the same end.
(4) The individuals owning the right to share in the
common source of supply cannot be deprived of this right by
legislation without such deprivation amounting to a taking
of private property.
(5) Since the legislature can regulate correlative rights
only to protect each person entitled thereto and since a
deprivation thereof amounts to a taking of private property,
it follows that the legislature cannot deprive a person of
correlative rights without provisions for just compensation,
nor, it would appear, can one individual deprive another of
this right without such deprivation being actionable.
If, as it would appear, the Supreme Court has established
that there are common law correlative rights of which a person
cannot be deprived, it follows that these rights exist independently of statutory recognition and, in fact, even in the
face of obvious legislative intent not to recognize them. Thus,
in Pattie v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n 6 when a leaseholder was denied an exception to the normal well location
on a drilling unit which he had applied for because he felt
the normal location would result in his obtaining either no
gas or less gas than that obtained by the well on the adjoining
drilling unit the Montana Supreme Court said:
Montana is the only state we can find that produces
substantial quantities of oil and gas, has a modernized Conservation Act, and belongs to the Interstate
Oil Compact Commission, but has no specific reference to correlative or private rights in the legislation. This case is truly unique. No similar cases
have been found and no oil and gas law treatise
6. 145 Mont. 531, 402 P.2d 596, 23 OIL & GAS REP. 65 (1965).
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or other writing has been found disclosing to us a
guide for the solution. Unless the Montana Act is
flexible enough to permit the Conmission to make
orders with an eye to the interests of adjacent landowners in sharing in the common supply the legislation would have to be held unconstitutional as a
deprivation of property without due process of
law ... '
This analysis indicates that the Wyoming Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission has had, since its inception, the
obligation to consider and protect correlative rights independently of any statutory requirements and that its protection must extend not only to that required by statute, but that
which exists by force of the common law. Accordingly, any
discussion of the commission's obligations must include a
determination of what rights are comprehended by the correlative rights concept.
It has been said that an analysis of the cases indicates
that the correlative rights of owners in a common source of
supply include: (1) the right against waste (deliberate or
negligent) of extracted substances; (2) the right against
spoilage of the common source of supply; (3) the right
against malicious depletion of the common source of supply;
and (4) the right to a fair opportunity to extract oil or gas.'
In Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky HeatingCo.9 the appellant (Louisville) had, through certain of its officers, stockholders and employees, created another company to acquire
leases on the structure from which Kentucky drew its fuel
and, with the expressed purpose of destroying Kentucky,
then proceeded to construct a carbon black plant through
which extremely large amounts of gas were run with the
resultant production of very little carbon black. The result
was, however, to so drastically lower the pressnre in the gas
pool as to threaten its destruction. In affirming an injunction
granted by the trial court against such acts the Court of
Appeals observed:
7. Id. at 599. See also Bernstein v. Bush, 29 Cal. 2d 778, 177 P.2d 913 (1947).
8. Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 Miss. LJ. 1 (1958); 1 KUNTz
OIL AND GAS § 4.3 (1962); Kuntz, Correlative Rights of Parties Owning
Interests for a Common Source of Supply of Oil and Gas, 17TH OIL & GAS

INST. 217 (Sw. LEGAL FDN. 1966).
9. 117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 868 (1908).
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Independently of the statute, the common law affords
an ample remedy for a wrong like this. While
natural gas is not subject to absolute ownership,
the owner of the soil must, in dealing with it, use
his own property with due regard to the rights of
his neighbor. He cannot be allowed deliberately to
waste the supply for the purpose of injuring his
neighbor. While a bad motive will not render that
unlawful which is lawful [citation omitted], a man
is only allowed to make a reasonable use of those
natural supplies which are for the common benefit
of all ....
The doctrine that an act which is legal
in itself, and violates no legal right, cannot be made
actionable on account of the motive which induced
it, has no application, because the acts of the defendants in wasting the gas violated the plaintiff's
legal rights. Both the parties drew gas from the
same reservoir. It was incumbent on each to exercise
his right so as not to injure the other unnecessarily.
If one wasted all of the gas from the reservoir, there
would be nothing left for the other. Every owner
may bore for gas on his own ground, and may make
a reasonable use of it; but he may not wantonly
injure or destroy the reservoir common to him and
his neighbor.'0
Thus, we see the establishment that, at common law, there
exist correlative rights against (1) a deliberate waste of the
extracted substances, and (2) a malicious depletion of the
reservoir. In discussing the malicious depletion of the common source of supply Kuntz concludes:
As is true in most competitive economic endeavors, the activities of a successful competitive
oil or gas operator have an inevitable impact upon
the economic welfare of others producing competitively from the same source of supply. Under the
law of capture, each is privileged to inflict loss
upon the other in the process of seeking an economic
advantage. Any loss is damnum absque injuria.
Where, however, the loss is inflicted for the purposes
other than of seeking a direct economic advantage
from the operation, an attempt is made to use the
10. Id. at 369-370. Accord. Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural
Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912 (1900); Hiamby v. City of Dawson
Springs, 126 Ky. 451, 104 S.W. 259 (1907); Calor Oil & Gas Co., V.
Kentucky Heating Co., 128 Ky. 715, 109 S.W. 328 (1908); Louisville Gas
Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 132 y. 435, 111 S.W. 374 (1908); United
Carbon Co. v. Campbellsville Gas Co., 230 Ky. 275, 18 S.W.2d 1110 (1929);
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
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law of capture as an instrument to inflict injury
deliberately. In such a situation, it would be reasonable to conclude that the privilege of inflicting
loss is lost. That is, the privilege of producing from
the common source of supply to the economic disadvantage of another owner may be exercised solely
for purposes of realizing direct economic gain and
not for a sinister purpose of inflicting harm deliberately upon another.11
The Texas Supreme Court held that negligent waste was
actionable in Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.," a case arising out
of allegedly negligent drilling operations permitting the well
to blow out, catch fire and crater. The cratering subsequently
spread to a gas well on the plaintiff's land, resulting in its
catching fire and burning for several years. In holding that
a right of action existed the court stated:
Each owner whose land overlies the basin has a like
interest, and each must of necessity exercise his
right with some regard to the rights of others. No
owner should be permitted to carry on his operations
in reckless or lawless irresponsibility, but must submit to such limitations as are necessary to enable
each to get his own. [Citation omitted].
While we are cognizant of the fact that there
is a certain amount of reasonable and necessary waste
incident to the production of oil and gas to which
the non-liability rule must also apply, we do not
think this immunity should be extended so as to
include the negligent waste or destruction of the oil
and gas.
[T]he negligent waste and destruction of
petitioners' gas and distillate was neither a legitimate drainage of the minerals from beneath their
lands nor a lawful or reasonable appropriation of
them.
In the conduct of one's business or in the
use and exploitation of one's property, the law imposes upon all persons the duty to exercise ordinary
care to avoid injury or damage to the property of
others. Thus under the commonlaw and independent
of the conservation statutes, the respondents were
1 KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS § 4.6 (1962).
12. 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
11.
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legally bound to use due care to avoid the negligent
waste or destruction of the minerals imbedded in
petitioners' oil and gas-bearing strata. This commonlaw duty the respondents failed to discharge.'
The right against spoilage of the common source of supply
would appear to differ from the right against waste of
extracted substances in that the damages protected against
would be damage to the reservoir itself resulting in the waste
of oil and/or gas through the inability to produce the substances rather than the physical waste of extracted substances
which is the gravamen of the rights against waste and the
malicious depletion of the common source of supply." Likewise, this correlative right has been established as a commonlaw right. 5
The fourth area encompassed by the doctrine of correlative rights according to the research of Kuntz 6 is the right
to a fair opportunity to extract oil or gas from the common
source of supply. We are told in this regard that "it is now
clear that what is sometimes referred to as the correlative
right to a fair share of oil or gas from a common source of
supply does not mean that each owner is entitled to a proportionate share of the substances, but it means that owners have
the right to a fair opportunity to extract oil or gas."'" The
authority cited for this proposition is Alphonzo E. Bell Corp.
v. Bell View Oil Syndicatei" in which it appears that the
proposition was asserted in the following passage:
The principle of the respondents, and apparently
accepted by the trial court is "that the owners of
all the land embraced within the boundaries of an
oil reservoir, between various points in which the oil
may migrate, own all the oil in that reservoir as
tenants in common." This principle has no support
in a single case called to our attention. When pro13. Id. at 562-63.
14. 1 KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS § 4.5 (1962).
15. Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57
N.E. 912, 917 (1900), stating:
Independently, . . . of any statute . . .the common owners of the gas
in the common reservoir, separately or together, have the right to
enjoin any and all acts of another owner . . . which will involve the
destruction of, the property in the common fund, or supply of gas.
Accord, Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 72 W. Va. 707, 79 S.E. 647
(Ct. App. 1913).
16. See authorities cited 8upra note 8.
17. 1 KUNrZ, OIL AND GAS § 4.7 (1962).
18. 24 Cal. App. 2d 587, 76 P.2d 167 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
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perly interpreted, the cases cited in support of the
alleged principle simply hold that the owners of the
surface have a common right to drill wells beginning on their own properties, so as to capture and
reduce to possession all the oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons that may be passing through the sands underlying such surface location .... That the surface
owners have a common and correlative right to take
from such sand strata, oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons passing through the sands underlying his
surface location, is all that the cases mean when
they speak of extracting oil, gas and hydrocarbons
from a common source. It is common to the extent
that every surface owner has a right to reduce to
possession all of the oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons
that may be intercepted by a well drilled upon his
own property, and does not mean that he has any
ownership in oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons that
may have passed through the sands underlying his
own property and into the sands underlying neighboring locations."9
The whole thrust of this portion of the court's opinion is
directed to the analysis of the contention that the surface
owners are tenants in common of the oil and/or gas in the
underlying reservoir. Quite clearly the court does say that
each such owner does not own the oil and/or gas passing
through that portion of the common source of supply overlaid
by the individual's surface ownership. We are not, however,
concerned with ownership of the oil and/or gas, but rather
with the exercise of a right, which exists by virtue of the
relationship existing between the surface and an underlying
geological feature, to reduce the oil and/or gas trapped in
the underlying structure to possession. A decision that the
surface owners are not the owners as tenants in common of
the oil and/or gas is not a decision that their right to reduce
those substances to possession is not a right to obtain a fair
proportion of the oil and/or gas in existence at the time the
right to reduce them to possession is exercised.
On the other hand the Supreme Court in Ohio Oil Co. 'v.
Indiana" does, arguably, indicate that the commonlaw correlative right includes the right to a proportionate share of
the oil and/or gas if the surface owner exercises the co-equal
19. Id. at 175.

20. 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
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right of all to reduce the oil and/or gas to possession. The
Court said: "Hence it is that the legislative power . . .can
be manifested for the purpose of protecting all the collective
owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from the
enjoyment by them, of their privilege to reduce to possession,
and to reach the like end by preventing waste."' It is the
legislative power which is to be exercised to protect all the
collective owners. How is this protection to be given? The
Court says "by securing a just distribution" which is to arise
from "their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach
the like end by preventing waste." Thus, the Court indicates
that the function of legislation in this area is to protect the
right of all the collective owners to a just distribution of the
oil and/or gas by regulating the privilege of drilling and by
preventing waste and is not to protect all the collective owners
by securing to them their co-equal right to drill which exists
by virtue of their ownership of the land overlying the common
reservoir. This view is strengthened by the Court's statement
that, "It follows from the essence of their right and from
the situation of the things, as to which it can be exerted,
that the use by one of his power to seek to convert a part of
the common fund to actual possession may result in an undue
proportion being attributed to one of the possessors of the
right, to the detriment of the others, or by waste by one or
' 22
more, to the annihilation of the rights of the remainder.
If the right is only to a fair opportunity to drill, how can an
exercise of this right "result in an undue proportion being
attributable to one of the possessors of the right to the detriment of the others"? Obviously, what may be received in
undue proportion or be annihilated by waste is the oil and/or
gas, not the right to drill which exists independently of the
presence or absence of oil and/or gas. It would appear quite
clear that the right to drill is meaningless apart from the
opportunity to share in the fruits of that drilling and that
it is the right to a "just distribution" which is the essence
of the common law correlative right." In either event, the
21. Id. at 210 (emphasis supplied).
22. Id.
23. (a) Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55, 69 (1936):
It may be assumed that House Bill 266 should be construed as
authorizing regulations to prevent waste, and to create and protect
correlative rights of owners in a common reservoir of gas to their
justly proportionate shares thereof, free of drainage to neighboring

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1968

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 3 [1968], Iss. 2, Art. 3

372

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol.

III

Wyoming Legislature has settled the matter insofar as the
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission is concerned
by either (1) broadening the conrnonlaw correlative right
to include the right to an equitable share of the oil or gas
or (2) by recognizing that this was the intended scope of
the commonlaw right as delineated by the Supreme Court.
While the legislative direction to protect correlative
rights is, by legislative definition, restricted to the right
to produce a just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or
both, in the pool 24 this article has attempted to demonstrate
lands. It may be assumed, also, that the statute, so construed, is a valid
exercise of the State's undoubted power to legislate to those ends . . .
(b) Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461,
57 N.E. 912, 915 (1900):
Natural gas in the ground is so far the subject of property rights in
the owners of the superincumbent lands, that while each of them has
the right to bore or mine for it on his land, and to use such portions
of it as, when left to the natural laws of flowage, may arise in the
wells of such owners and into his pipes, no one of the owners of such
land has the right, without the consent of all the other owners, to
induce an unnatural flow into or through his own wells ....
(c) Quinn v. Pere Marguette Ry. Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376, 380
(1931):
The deed contains no reservation to grantors. The grantee took title
to the gas and oil in place. If there is a pool common to the lands
of both parties, then, if defendant may not drill, plaintiff, by tapping
the pool, may take oil belonging to defendant. Such a result could
not be sanctioned, and, if it were imperative to restrain defendant
from drilling, equity necessarily would attempt to require an accounting
by plaintiff for defendant's oil taken by him.
(d) Bernstein v. Bush, 29 Cal. 2d 773, 177 P.2d 913, 918 (1947):
From the foregoing it follows that the respondent's disapproval of the
petitioners' proposal to drill a well in accordance with the notice of
intention on file, if effective to prevent such drilling, would amount to
a deprivation of the petitioners' right, co-equal with the right of surrounding owners and lessees, to recover their fair share of the oil and
gas from the common source of supply, and consequently would infringe
upon the constitutional guarantees invoked.
(e) Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (1948):
In this manner, if all operators exercise the same degree of skill and
diligence, each owner will recover in most instances his fair share of
the oil and gas. This reasonable opportunity to produce his fair share
of the oil and gas is the landowners' commonlaw right under our theory
of absolute ownership of the minerals in place.
While such cases as Ryan Consol. Petro. Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221,
285 S.W.2d 201 (1955) and Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff, 321 S.W.2d
167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) tend to indicate that the right is solely the equal
opportunity to drill such cases as Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n.,
162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W.2d 801 (1961), Railroad Comm'n. v. Williams, 163
Tex. 370, 356 S.W.2d 131 (1961), and Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n., 163
Tex. 417, 357 S.W.2d 364 (1962) appear to recognize that the opportunity
to a fair share means a proportionate share in the oil and gas.
(f) Pattie v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n., 145 Mont. 531, 402 P.2d
596, 23 OIL & GAS REP. 65 (1965).
(g) Dodds v. Ward, 418 P.2d 629, 631 (Okla. 1966):
Correlative rights is a convenient term for indicating that each owner
of land in common source of supply of oil and gas has legal privileges
as against other owners of land therein to take oil and gas therefrom
by lawful operations conducted on his own land, limited however, by
duties to other owners not to injure source of supply and not to take
an undue share of oil and gas.
24. Wyo. STAT. § 30-216(i) (Comp. 1967).
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that the obligation is a commonlaw one which is considerably
broader than the legislative declaration and is an obligation
which will be required even in the face of obvious legislative
intent to the contrary.2 5 Some brief consideration will also
be given to the means by which the commission can effectuate
the legislative mandate.
The direction to protect correlative rights raises the
question as to what is meant by protect. In its normal use
it indicates an obligation to guard or to defend from harm
or destruction. The question then becomes one as to whether
or not this obligation to defend or guard a person's correlative
rights can be exercised by considering the person's correlative
rights when the commission issues regulatory orders, or whether the discharge of such duty requires an adjudication of
conflicts involving correlative rights. Article 2, Section I of
the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides:
The powers of the government of this state are
divided into three distinct departments: the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall
exercise any powers properly belonging to either of
the others, except as in this constitution expressly
directed or permitted.
Article 5, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides:
The judicial power of the state shall be vested
in the senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in
a supreme court, district court, justice of the peace,
court of arbitration and such courts as the legislature
may, by general law establish for incorporated cities
or incorporatedtowns. [Emphasis added].
The constitution expressly provides for the separation of
powers amongst the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the state government and provides that no branch
shall exercise "any powers properly belonging to either of
the others" and further expressly provides for the exercise
of the judicial power only by specified courts "and such
courts as the legislature may . . . establish for incorporated
cities or incorporated towns." Thus, if a judicial function
25. See text accompanying notes 6 and 7 supra.
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is necessary to discharge the obligation to protect correlative
rights, it is possible that the legislature may have violated
Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming." The judicial power apparently is exercised anytime
a dispute between two individuals is litigated and decided as
to strictly individual right27 or when an individual's right
of property is determined.2 8 It would appear, then, that if
the commission considers the correlative right of individuals
as one of the factors involved in the making of its rules,
regulations, and orders and does not attempt to determine
those rights among individuals that it has not performed the
judicial function and, thus, would not be violating the constitutional separation of powers.
Having ascertained the scope of the correlative rights
which the commission has been charged with protecting, some
brief mention should be made of the means by which the
commission can discharge its obligation to give that protection.
It would appear that the required protection can be afforded
through a combination of the following methods: (1) by the
prevention of waste through such means as (a) restricting
production to that allowed by utilization of the M.E.R., (b)
prohibiting open pit storage, (c) prohibiting the unreasonable
blowing of gas wells, (d) prohibiting the unreasonable flaring
of gas, (e) prohibiting improper abandonment procedures,
(f) prohibiting improper operation of wells, (g) prohibiting
improper completion procedures, (h) establishment of drilling units, and (i) restricting the number and location of
wells; (2) by providing for exceptions to the location and
number of wells on the drilling unit and by increasing or
decreasing the size of the drilling unit; (3) compulsory pooling; (4) pro-rationing of production; and (5) by ratable
take of production.
It is not within the scope of this article to consider the
application of these methods to the protection of correlative
rights or to consider the problems created by such application.
26. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258, 269 (1900):
The legislature has not attempted to devest the courts of that jurisdiction, and we do not think it could successfully do so.
The court gave some indication, however, that the appellate function provided for the courts might be sufficient to avoid violating the constitutional
provision.
27. In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 179 A. 344 (1935); State v.
Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
28. Laisne v. State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 123 P.2d 457 (1942).
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Nor does the author intend, by such listing, to indicate that
these are the only or the exclusive methods by which the
commission may discharge its obligations to protect correlative rights. It is the intention to give some idea of the means
which can be utilized and, thus, to give an indication of the
areas in which problems may arise in relation to correlative
rights and the nature of those problems.
A reading of the statutes indicates that the Wyoming
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission has been given adequate authority and power to discharge the obligation imposed
upon it of protecting correlative rights. The commission has
been given the authority and power (a) to prevent waste,2"
(b) to establish drilling units, ° (c) to restrict the number
and location of wells for each drilling unit,"' (d) grant exceptions from the authorized location,32 (e) to decrease the size
of drilling units,83 (f) to permit the drilling of additional
wells,34 (g) to pro-rate production among the several wells
or properties when the production from the pool is restricted
to an amount less than that which the pool could produce
if no restriction were imposed, 5 (h) to require ratable taking
in a pool by each person purchasing or taking oil or gas for
transportation, 6 and (i) to compulsorily pool interests in a
drilling unit. 7
CONCLUSION

The legislative injunction that the commission protect
correlative rights imposes no greater obligation than existed.
Correlative rights exist as common law rights against (1) the
waste of extracted substances, (2) spoilage of the common
reservoir, (3) malicious depletion of the common source of
supply, and (4) as the right to extract a fair share of the
oil or gas. Any abridgement of these rights by the legislature
amounts to a taking of private property for which compensation must be paid.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

WYo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Id.
Wyo.
Id.

STAT. § 30-217 to -219 (1957).
STAT. § 30-221(a) (Comp. 1967).
STAT. § 30-221(c) (Comp. 1967).

35.

Wyo. STAT. § 30-217

STAT.

36. Wyo. STAT.
37. WYo. STAT.

§
§§
§§

30-221(d)

(Comp. 1967).

(Comp. 1967).

30-234.1-234.2 (Comp. 1967).
30-221(f), (g) (Comp. 1967).
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